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INTRODUCTION: WHY SHOULD WE TALK ABOUT 
PROPERTIES IN QM? 
As a philosopher of science, I think that the best and most honest way to celebrate 
Gian Carlo Ghirardi 70th birthday is to offer some metaphysical remarks on a 
remarkable aspect of the quantum world, namely the radical relativization of the 
notion of physical property that quantum mechanics (henceforth, QM) has forced upon 
us, independently of the various interpretations. It may seem even obsolete to try to 
talk about “properties” in the holistic, contextual setting of QM, where “contextual” 
has of course a precise meaning, derived from well-known no-go theorems against the 
possibility of simultaneously assigning non-contextual and definite values to a 
physical system whose Hilbert space has dimensions greater than two [1]. 
Let me clarify at the outset that the notion of “property” I advocate is not so 
speculative or metaphysical: the idea is that a physical system possesses a property 
when some observable A has a definite, precise magnitude within the margins of 
experimental error. Think of the mass or the charge of an electron, or of the intensity 
of the electric field in a given space-time region, as examples of “kosher” physical 
properties, where kosher means that they are non-contextually and intrinsically 
possessed by the electron and the field respectively. Such properties are intrinsically 
possessed by electron and the field in the sense that their magnitude is independent of 
the test particles that we must necessarily use to measure them. It seems to follow that 
if talking about a physical property presupposes a certain degree of intrinsic-ness or 
independence of the property from whatever else exist in the world, then we may well 
have to conclude that the notion of property, as it was normally presupposed in 
classical physics, in QM undergoes, to say the least, a radical change which deserves 
some further investigation. If (i) contextuality is ubiquitous across interpretations as 
different as Bohm’s, Everett’s, GRW’s and Bohr’s, and if (ii) the contextuality of a 
property x is equivalent to the fact that the system lacks x altogether, why still talk of 
microentities possessing dispositional properties? Isn’t the very talk of property the 
residue of an old metaphysics that we should dispose of? 
In order to inquire into the alleged dispositional character of the quantum world and 
try to answer the question above, I begin by clarifying some problematic metaphysical 
distinctions between intrinsic and relational properties on the one hand, and occurrent 
or categorical and dispositional properties on the other. Then I review some of the 
main interpretations of QM (Bohm, GRW, Everett/Rovelli and Bohr), in order to show 
to which extent they are committed to dispositional properties. It will turn out that the 
only theory in which dispositions and relations are reducible to categorical properties 
is Bohm’s, and this is especially evident in the so-called “minimalist” interpretation 
due to the “trio” [3]. On the one hand, the fact that dispositions play a (albeit different) 
role in interpretations as different as Bohm, Bohr’s, Everett’s and GRW’s might tempt 
one to claim that dispositionality is a feature of the micro-world that is here to stay. On 
the other, the presence of irreducible dispositions might be regarded as the safest piece 
of evidence of the fact that we still don’t understand QM. 
 
 




Just to motivate an incursion into the metaphysics of properties, consider that 
talking of “properties” cannot easily be dispensed in the context of QM, since, at least 
prima facie, in unified dynamical models like those proposed by Gian Carlo Ghirardi 
and collaborators, it plays a pivotal role [2]. After all, the measurement problem 
consist in finding out in which circumstances we are allowed to attribute a definite 
property to a physical system.  
Let us begin by considering that physics is full of dispositional properties (in short 
dispositions): think just of the paradigmatic cases of “fragility” or “permeability”. 
These dispositions are characterized by the fact that they become manifest and 
observable only in certain contexts. “Being broken”, or “being wet” are not only the 
manifestations of these dispositional properties, but are also instances of categorical 
or non-dispositional properties. Intuitively, a disposition like permeability is not 
directly observable all the times, as is the property given by the form of an object 
(“being spherical”), but becomes observable only when the entity possessing it 
interacts with water or other fluids. Why should we worry about dispositions in QM? 
Typically, a dispositional property of glass, like “fragility”, which is a macroscopic 
property, is reducible to, identical with, or explainable in terms of,1 the 
atomic/molecular structure of the glass, referred to as the microscopic, categorical 
basis of the disposition, plus the breaking context (the stone hitting the glass). 
Likewise, being flexible or being a good conductor, qua dispositional, macroscopic 
properties of copper, are all regarded as being reducible to, identical with, or 
explainable in terms of, the atomic structure and forces holding together the 
microscopic components of copper. The question I want to raise in this paper is 
whether and in what sense QM, in its various interpretations, forces us to accept the 
existence of ungrounded, irreducible, probabilistic dispositions, i.e. dispositions, that, 
unlike fragility or permeability, lack any categorical basis to which they can be 
reduced to. My claim is that the presence of irreducible quantum dispositions in many 
(but not all) interpretations involves the difficulty of giving a spatiotemporal 
descriptions to quantum phenomena, and is therefore linked to our lack of 
understanding of the theory, i.e., of our lack of a clear ontology underpinning the 
formalism. Before reviewing the various interpretations from this perspective, 
however, it is important to clarify the ground from possible confusions between 
relational, dispositional, contextual and their antonyms, namely, intrinsic, categorical 
and non-contextual properties. 
Consider dispositions like “irritable” or “poisonous”, which manifest themselves in 
appropriate contexts, when people get angry and mushrooms poison the blood. From 
these ordinary language examples, it would seem that the function of dispositional 
terms in natural languages is to encode useful information about the way objects 
around us would behave were they subject to causal interactions with other entities 
(often ourselves). This remark shows that the function of dispositional predicates in 
ordinary language is essentially predictive. Consider the evolutionary advantage of 
classing all animals or people around our ancestors as “dangerous” or “innocuous”, as 
“peaceful” or “ferocious”. In learning that a particular mushroom is “poisonous”, a 
child learning the language also learns to stay away from it whenever she recognizes 
one.  
I think that the predictive role of dispositional terms is the main explanation of the 
reason why natural languages are so replete with dispositional terms, which refer to 
microscopic, inner non-directly observable properties, and also point, more or less 
directly, to the complex relationships linking dispositions with causes, counterfactuals 
and, eventually, laws of nature as they are expressed in our scientific languages. A 
stone causes the manifestation of the disposition “fragile” (and therefore causes the 
breaking of the glass) because it causally interacts with its microscopic structure. 
Counterfactuality is involved because attribution of the disposition fragility to the 
glass entails that were it struck in an appropriate way, the glass would break, while the 
regularity with which the fragility of glasses is manifested refers to a law of nature 
capturing the behavior of the micro-constituents of glass. In a word, dispositions 
                                                 
1 The choice between these three options is highly debated in the philosophical literature on dispositions, but here we can avoid to 
take a stand among them. 
express, directly or indirectly, those regularities of the world around us that enable us 
to predict the future. Such a predictive function of dispositions should be attentively 
kept in mind when we will discuss the “dispositional nature” of microsystems before 
measurement, in particular when their states is not an eigenstate of the relevant 
observable. In a word, the use of the language of “dispositions” does not by itself point 
to a clear ontology underlying the observable phenomena, but, especially when the 
disposition is irreducible, refers to the predictive regularity that phenomena manifest. 
Consequently, attributing physical systems irreducible dispositions, even if one were 
realist about them, may just result in more or less covert instrumentalism.   
The “epistemic cash-value” of dispositional terms also points to another, related 
feature of dispositions, first stressed by the founders of modern mechanical 
philosophy, but already known to the ancient atomists. This feature corresponds to the 
fact that dispositional terms, besides expressing predictions, also refer to the way the 
world “in itself” appears or manifests itself to our senses. “Odorous” and “stinking”, 
referred to a rose and to rotten meat, “sweet” and “sour”, referred to sugar and lemons, 
“red” and “white”, referred to two flowers, for philosophers like Galileo, Boyle, 
Descartes and Locke, do not point to properties existing in themselves (independently 
of our minds), but to the products of the interaction between the “primary”, intrinsic 
qualities of the objects around us (including their intrinsic dispositions) and our 
sensory system (they way such dispositions manifest themselves to sensory beings like 
ourselves). 
This second role that dispositions have had in the philosophical language seems to 
call attention to the fact that human beings filter and respond selectively to the mind-
independent properties of the external world, either through their nervous system or 
their minds. And this sense has also been regarded as important in all those 
interpretations in which human consciousness is explicitly invoked to solve the 
measurement problem [4,5].2 The difference with the primary/secondary quality 
distinction proposed by modern philosophers is that dispositions evoking in our minds 
secondary properties or “qualia” such as red, hot, sweet, could still be referred to 
primary qualities like the shape, the number and other categorical properties of 
corpuscles or atoms, which were their categorical basis. When a system is in a 
superposition of states, however, it is not at all clear which definite, categorical 
properties could form the basis for our perception of pointers being in a definite 
position.  
Notice that in both of their functions, the ordinary and the more philosophical one, 
the manifestation of dispositional properties presupposes causal interactions of some 
sort: the property of “being soluble” needs an interaction with some liquid to manifest 
itself, in the same sense in which the fragrance of a flower needs the interaction of 
certain chemicals with human nostrils and rhinencephalons for its manifestation. 
Despite the relational nature of the manifestation of dispositions, it would be a 
mistake to identify the non-dispositional or categorical properties with the merely 
intrinsic properties of an object, namely with those properties whose exemplification 
by an entity does not presuppose the existence of any other entity.3 In order to avoid 
                                                 
2 As a matter of fact, later in life Wigner tried to propose non linear modifications of Schrödinger’s equation. [6. p.339]. 
3 To understand the difference, compare being square, which is intrinsic, with being simultaneous with, which is relational. The 
first predicate is monadic, as it needs only one filler, while the second is at least two-placed. 
misleading confusions, it is important to stress that “dispositional” and “relational” are 
to be regarded as logically independent notions, exactly like their opposites, 
“categorical” and “intrinsic” [7, p. 69]. Granted that we must distinguish the 
possession of a property from our way of ascertaining that such a property is 
possessed – something which always calls into question a causal or an experimental 
context – charge, spin and mass should be regarded as intrinsic, non-relational 
properties of microscopic particles. One could be tempted to claim that being intrinsic 
is at least sufficient for being non-dispositional, so that “being dispositional” might 
entail “being relational” (the contrapositive claim). However, it makes perfect sense to 
claim that my window pane is fragile even if it never breaks and that it would continue 
to remain fragile even if no other object were around. If we distinguish, as we should, 
the possession of a property from our way of ascertaining such a possession, a glass 
would be fragile even if it were the only object in the universe, so that it could never 
break for “lack of stones”.  
In this sense, any disposition can be regarded as an intrinsically possessed property, 
so that being intrinsic is not sufficient for being categorical. Equivalently, if a 
disposition can be, and usually is, intrinsic, it follows that relationality is not necessary 
to dispositionality. And neither is it sufficient, as the trivial example of “being the son 
of”, a relation that is not a disposition, clearly shows. Against Popper, therefore, who 
treated dispositions or probabilistic propensities as objective but relational features of 
the whole experimental set-up [8], we should distinguish the possession of a 
dispositional property, which has a certain probability of manifesting itself in a 
determinate way, from such a manifestation, which is clearly an event, a causal 
process, (the breaking of the glass, the hitting of a quantum particle on a fluorescent 
screen, etc) and not a property. The categorical property “broken” or “located on a 
spot” is somehow the conclusion of the process of manifestation of the disposition. 
Finally, we should ask what is the conceptual relationship between the attribution 
of dispositions and contextuality as it emerges in Kochen-Specker’s hypothesis and 
similar no-go results. The idea of contextuality is simple: if we assign a certain value 
to the square of the operator “spin in the z direction” – call it S2z – when it is measured 
together with S2x and S2y in the direction x and y, if S2z is not contextual we must get 
the same value if we measure it together with S2x’ and S2y’, assuming that the direction 
x’ and y’ are different from x and y. Therefore, contextualism seems to entail that 
some QM “properties” are not possessed before measurement, since otherwise they 
could not manifest themselves in different ways according to the type of measurement 
we perform.4  
This fact seems to establish a strong link between contextuality and 
dispositionality. Within QM, it seems natural to replace “dispositional properties” with 
“intrinsically indefinite properties”, i.e. with properties that before measurement are 
objectively and actually “indefinite” (that is, without a precise, possessed value). So 
the passage from dispositional to non-dispositional is the passage from the 
indefiniteness to the definiteness of the relevant properties, due to measurements 
interactions.  
                                                 
4 In different words, we cannot assume that there is a one-to one correspondence between an operator and an observable, so that 
contextualism bans a certain form of naïve realism about operators [9]. 
Of course, in those situations in which the system possesses a precise value of a 
certain observable (property) even before measurement (when its state is an eigenstate 
of the observable), the measurement interaction provided by the experimental context 
simply amplifies the microscopic value to a macroscopic, classical scale.  
Consequently, in QM we seem to have two kinds of intrinsically possessed 
properties, depending on the way the system has been prepared before measurement: if 
the system has a definite value also before measurement and the latter just reveals it, 
the system possesses a categorical property, which the apparatus simply reveals. On 
the contrary, if the value revealed by the measurement interaction causally depends on, 
or is even created by, the interaction, we have a form of contextualism which implies 
the presence of intrinsic dispositions [10, p. 283]. In this second case, the idea is that 
the property that is experimentally manifested by the microsystem depends on the 
measurement context.  
Consequently, following in part [10] – who distinguish between two forms of 
contextuality, a weak and a strong form – I propose to redefine the classical distinction 
between dispositional and non-dispositional (categorically possessed) properties 
simply in terms of the difference between states of quantum systems that are and 
states that are not in an eigenstate of the relevant observable. 
 
Before examining the main interpretations of QM with the purpose of 
understanding the role played by reducible and irreducible dispositions, I must face a 
couple of foreseeable objections that were briefly voiced in the introduction. Why 
should we attribute intrinsic dispositions to have a spin in the z direction to, say, 
particles in a superposition of spin up in the x direction and spin down in the x 
direction, given a certain orientation of a Stern-Gerlach magnet? Isn’t it more 
appropriate to claim that a micro-system in such a superposed state of spin before 
measurement simply has no spin at all in the z direction? The first objection, in a 
word, is that, at least in the context of QM, “properties that are merely contextual (i.e., 
dispositional in our language) are no properties at all, they do not exist, and their 
inadequacy to play the role of properties is meant in the strongest possible sense” [6, 
p. 330, my transl.]. In addition, what do we gain, for purposes of explanation and 
prediction within, say, GRW type of theories, by attributing isolated microsystems an 
intrinsically, non reducible disposition to localize, over and above writing down the 
law that explains how and when localizations occur?  
In the case of contextual/dispositional properties like spin direction in the Bohmian 
interpretation, on which we will return in the following sections, I will just say this: 
affirming that a microsystem has a disposition to manifest a certain spin along the z 
direction is consistent with, and implied by, the claim that before measurement it has 
no categorical property of that type. The attribution of the disposition to the 
microsystem in question at this stage has just the purpose of reminding us that what 
we observe in a quantum experiment is often the product of an interaction between 
some property, tendency or capacity of the microsystem (however we want to call the 
possession of magnet-like structure) and the apparatus, in such a way that what we 
observe after the interaction was not there before. Analogously, mechanisms of 
spontaneous localizations of the wave functions in certain GRW models are consistent 
with claiming that before localizing, microsystems have just a tendency to localize but 
possess no definite position at all. Such a difference with classical physics is worth 
noting at least on a first analysis, and even Bohm and Hiley have written that “The 
context dependence of results of measurements is a further indication of how our 
interpretation does not imply a simple return to the basic principles of classical 
physics.”[11, p. 9]. The advantage of using the word “dispositions” in such cases lies 
simply in creating the presupposition for a conceptual confrontation of QM with 
classical physics, and nothing more “metaphysical” than that. With this clarification, I 
think that the use of a dispositional talk will not be misleading. 
As to the second criticism, we learned from the debate on disposition that we 
cannot analyze fragility in a conditional way (“fragile” does not mean that “if 
appropriately struck it breaks”), since a piece of glass remains fragile even if it will 
never break. Therefore, a reducible disposition is something more than a predictive 
correlation expressed by a material conditional “if…then…”; but what can we say 
about the irreducible disposition of a single proton to localize? Is there something to it 
more than the phenomenological law describing the average process?  
In order to test the validity of the first reply and try to answer the question above, it 
will best to examine the different role that dispositions play in QM, the main 
difference being not their presence in the various interpretation, but their reducibility. 
In having chosen to present only some of the most discussed interpretations of QM, I 
readily admit that my review does not exhaust all possible ways of understanding it5: 
my aim is rather to try to understand how fruitful and unifying the perspective offered 
by dispositions can be in making sense of the ontology of the theory.  
 
“DISPOSITIONALIST” READINGS OF QM 
 
Interestingly, we find dispositionalist views of QM both in subjectivist and in 
objectivist interpretations. To begin with the latter, Karl Popper has often regarded his 
propensity interpretation of QM as his major contribution to the philosophy of physics, 
and of QM in particular [8]. Both he and Nicholas Maxwell after him [14] have 
defended some sort of a propensity interpretation of probability, and a view of 
quantum reality essentially characterized by irreducibly probabilistic but real 
propensity (propensity waves or propensitons). On the former camp, instead, Werner 
Heisenberg had made direct reference to Aristotelian potentiae to refer to and interpret 
the elusive nature of the atomic and subatomic world before measurement: «Such a 
probability function [i.e. the statistical algorithm of quantum theory] combines 
objective and subjective elements. It contains statements on possibilities, or better 
tendencies (“potentiae” in Aristotelian philosophy), and such statements are 
completely objective, they don’t depend on any observer…the passage from the 
“possible” to the real takes place during the act of observation» [12, pp. 67-69]. It 
should be noted in passing that here Heisenberg might have described also the 
measurement interaction in a less subjective way, by insisting that “the passage from 
the possible to the real” occurs in any interaction with a measuring instrument, and not 
                                                 
5 For instance, I have omitted the modal interpretations, in which propensities may have a certain role [16, 17].  
just with human observers. After all, unless one expects from consciousness a special 
but illegitimate help to solve the measurement problem, within the context of that 
problem “observers” should be regarded simply as highly complex physical systems: 
one cannot solve a mystery by invoking another mystery. When Heiseberg claims that 
potentialities are objective, he means that the probabilities that measure them are not 
subjective, but express objective chance. 
Some years before, Henry Margenau had already characterized the properties of 
quantum systems as merely latent, in contrast to the properties intervening in the 
description of classical systems, which are always definite even when they are merely 
dispositional [13, p. 6]. In discussing Bohm’s contextualism, we will see that this 
statement is essentially flawed.  
Probably influenced by this tradition, Michael Redhead’s influential textbook on 
the philosophy of QM distinguishes among three different interpretations of the 
theory, the second of which presupposes real propensities and potentialities and 
attributes to measurements the function of «converting latent values in possessed 
values» [15, p. 48].6 Clearly, for this second interpretation to make more than an 
instrumentalistic sense, one needs to construe potentialities and dispositions as real 
properties of systems. More recently, Mauricio Suárez has defended a new propensity 
interpretation of QM [16, 17] against two objections by Grossman [18] and Milne 
[19]. In his view, a quantum propensity is intrinsic to the quantum system (it is 
independent of the experimental set-up that is designed to make it manifest), and it is 
only the manifestation of the property that is relational. Furthermore, he attaches an 
important meaning to the dispositionality view by linking it to the measurement 
problem.  
Despite this literature (see also [10]), what seems to be lacking, however, is a more 
systematic survey of the territory covered by dispositions within the main 
interpretations of QM; this seems important in order to get a firmer grasp of the 
dispensability or the centrality of a dispositional talk in understanding the nature of 








As is well known, in David Bohm’s mechanics, QM is regarded as incomplete, and 
is supplemented by an additional but “not so hidden” variables, the changing-in-time 
positions of all particles composing a physical system. Such a variable is obviously 
epistemically inaccessible before a measurement, but since it is postulated to be 
definite at all times, it can be revealed by faithful measurements.  
The theory consists by two equations, the familiar Schrödinger’s deterministic 
differential equation: 
                                                 
6 The first position he discusses is the Copenhagen interpretation, while the third is associated with a “property realism” of 
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and an additional “guidance equation”, relating non-locally the velocity of the k-th 
particle to the positions Q = (Q1,….. Qn) of all the others, and more precisely, to the 
gradient of the ψ-function with respect to the k-coordinate of the particle: 
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 Besides its deterministic features, for our purpose it is of paramount importance to 
remind the reader that (i) this interpretation divides the physical observables into two 
categories, the non-contextual or categorically possesses properties, and the contextual 
or dispositional properties, and that (ii) position is regarded as the only categorical 
property. As we know, in our terminology this essentially means that position is the 
only variable that can be regarded as being possessed before measurement and 
independently of measurement: the choice of position as the only categorical property 
is suggested by the practical need to explain our definite macroscopical observations 
(the choice of momentum as a categorical property would be an open theoretical 
possibility but lack in explanatory power). It is easier to understand why a pointer is 
there rather than in a macroscopic superposition of being “here and there” if its 
particles are always in a definite position.  
Furthermore, the categorical aspect of position has another extremely important 
aspect, linked to the centrality that spacetime assumes in Bohmian mechanics. Clearly, 
the possession of a definite position by all particles at all times implies that QM is 
describable within a definite spatiotemporal arena (Newtonian spacetime, regarded as 
a collection of worldlines). Of course, I am not claiming that all categorical properties 
are spatiotemporal or geometrical properties, even though the form or the shape of an 
object are paradigmatic examples of non-dispositional properties. Rather, I am arguing 
that the non-dispositional character of position “forces” Bohmian mechanics to give 
spacetime a preeminent role. This might have far reaching consequences in view of a 
quantum theory of gravity: it seems difficult that spacetime can emerge from a 
quantum domain, if the latter requires the former to make sense of its ontological 
posits. Of course, abandoning localized particles as approximation in another regime 
(say, the relativistic regime) would substantially weaken my claim, but we don’t have 
so far a fully developed relativistic Bohmian mechanics.  
The dispositional/contextual features of this interpretation follows from the fact that 
the wave function depends in a non-local way on the positions of the particles 
composing the system, as well as on the whole experimental setup.7 In order to be 
more specific, suppose that we are trying to measure along the z direction the spin of a 
particle that is in a superposition of being up and down in the z direction with equal 
                                                 
7 Such a contextualism is a welcome consequence of Bohm’s theory, since the contrary assumption that all properties of a 
quantum system have definite, possessed values that are independent of the measurement context would lead to a contradiction 
with the above mentioned Kochen and Specker’s theorem [1]. 
probability. If we invert the polarity of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus by leaving 
everything else unchanged, we change the measurement result of spin in the z-
direction: if we had obtained z-up in the previous measurement, now we obtain z-
down and vice versa. To put it in a slogan, “positions being equal, different 
measurements yield different results”. 
Given this fact, the property of “having a definite spin in the z-direction” is not 
categorical or intrinsic, or faithfully measured: measurements do not in general reveal 
the pre-existing possessed value of spin along the z-direction, for the simple reason 
that there isn’t any even in Bohm’s interpretation! If by switching the magnet and 
leaving everything else unchanged we change the experimental outcome from z-up to 
z-down, prior to measurement the system has no definite property of having a spin in 
the z-direction. Before measurement, the property “spin along the z-direction” is 
therefore dispositional, for the simple reason that the experimental outcome causally 
depends on the measurement context together, of course, with the “hidden”, 
categorical and non-contextual value of the position of the particle.  
Exactly for this reason, however, in the Bohmian interpretation the dispositional 
properties of “spins along a given direction” – referred to particles that before 
measurement are in a state of superposition with respect to that direction – are 
reducible to position and the context of measurement [10, pp. 285-6]. The idea of 
reducibility is based upon the fact that our hypothetical knowledge of the position of 
the particle plus knowledge of the orientation of the magnet would enable us to deduce 
the experimental outcome with certainty.  
We can now go back to Margenau’s comment reported above. We have seen that 
also in Bohm’s theory, which is the most realistic about possessed properties, there 
cannot be any pre-existing, real property of “having a spin in a certain direction” to be 
revealed by measurements along that direction. If in the quantum case measurement 
somehow creates the property, isn’t this different from fragility, which is possessed in 
a definite degree by a glass also before the breaking context? In order to defend a 
perfect analogy between a Bohmian disposition “to have spin in a given direction” and 
classical dispositions like those possessed by a glass, however, one must simply point 
out that the latter’s “propensity to break in a certain context” corresponds to “the 
propensity to manifest a definite spin in a certain measurement context”. Anyone 
committed to the reality of dispositions would clearly maintain that such a propensity 
is possessed by Bohmian particles also before measurement, and independently of it. 
Consequently, in the Bohmian case at least, the correct analogy with the classical 
disposition “fragility” is not given by “having a definite spin” but by “the disposition 
to have a definite spin in a given direction”, which is linked to the fact that elementary 
particles can be deflected by magnetic fields, analogously to tiny magnetic needles 
that in some circumstances do not point along a z direction (when they are in a 
superposition of spin along that directions).  
It follows that the manifestation of the two dispositions is, respectively, the 
breaking event in one case and the acquisition of a definite spin in the other. 
Accordingly, and even from the viewpoint of a realist position about dispositions, 
Clifton and Pagonis are correct in holding that the dispositionality of properties in 
Bohm’s theory is “nothing to write home about”, as it is not remarkably different from 




DISPOSITIONS IN GRW 
 
In the so-called dynamical reduction models of non-relativistic QM, to which we 
will refer – somewhat schematically and with apologies to the others contributors to 
this interesting research program – with GRW (from the acronym of their main 
inventors, Gian Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber), the definite, 
macroscopic world of our experience, threatened to be in a nebulous state by the 
universal validity of the principle of superposition conjoined with the assumption of 
completeness of QM, is obtained via a modification of the linearity of Schrödinger’s 
equation.8 In GRW’s original model [21], on which we will focus here, the wave 
function of a system is multiplied by a localization function, which physically 
represents a spontaneous localization in a “limited” region of space of a previously 
non-localized quantum system.  
According to this reduction model, the fundamentally stochastic nature of the 
localization mechanism is not grounded in any categorical property of the quantum 
system: the theory at present stage is purely “phenomenological”, in the sense that no 
“deeper mechanism” is provided to account for the causes of the localization. 
“Spontaneous”, as referred to the localization process, therefore simply means 
“uncaused”. This remark is going to be of fundamental importance to provide 
evidence in favor of the view that in this interpretation of QM, localization 
mechanisms are ungrounded or irreducible, probabilistic dispositions. However, 
despite their irreducibility, such dispositions can be measured and have a predictive 
import, as they can tell us in a precise way how often and at what scale does a 
localization occur. 
In the attempt to unify the dynamics of microscopic and macroscopic systems, in 
[21] GRW suppose in fact that all individual quantum systems have an irreducibly 
probabilistic disposition to localize in a region of space whose dimension is 
approximately 10-5 cm, with a frequency f given by 10-16 sec-1. The probability that 
such a process occurs is approximately once every hundred million years, and this 
hypothesis explains why isolated quantum systems can typically remain for a very 
long time in non-localized or superposed state (i.e., they are “spread” across a large 
region of space).  
However, since a macroscopic system is constituted in average by 1023 atomic 
components, and since in GRW’s model the localization of a single particle drives the 
collapse of all the others, it follows that the components of a macroscopic apparatus (a 
pointer) that are correlated with the particle that we want to measure will undergo a 
localization every 10-7 seconds. In fact, the average number of particles that will 
collapse spontaneously in a second is given by 10-16 x 1023 = 107, which means that the 
macroscopic apparatus remains in a state of indefinite position (i.e., in a superposition 
                                                 
8 A recent, very accurate survey of dynamical reduction models is given in [20]. 
of two position states) for no more that 10-7 seconds: as Bell put it, Schrödinger’s cat 
remains neither dead nor alive for no more than a split second [22, p. 44]. 
For our purposes, it is essential to stress once again that the new uncaused tendency 
to “swerve” attributed to atoms by GRW (in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura we read of a 
“clinamen” accidentally deviating the vertical fall of the Democritean atoms)9 is an 
irreducibly dispositional property, that becomes actual or is manifested in ways that 
could call for – were the new theory prove to be successful in overcoming its present 
difficulties with a relativistic extension – the introduction of new constants of nature.  
Furthermore, despite the fact that the irreducibly stochastic propensity to localize is 
not grounded in any categorical properties of the quantum system, it is nevertheless 
strongly explanatory of the definiteness of the macroscopic world of our experience. 
In this case, and using the familiar example from scholastic philosophy, we are not 
facing virtutes dormitivae which tautologically “explain” why opium makes you sleep. 
Consequently, and this is important especially for the philosophical debate, we should 
change our prejudices concerning ungrounded dispositional properties as being always 
explanatorily empty. The remarkable explanatory power of GRW type models is given 
by the unification that the modified Schrödinger’s equation achieves between the 
dynamical evolution of quantum systems and the classical evolution of macroscopic 
systems, in accord with well-known philosophical theories which regard scientific 
explanations as unifications of phenomena under a single, more general law of nature  
[23, 24]. 
An ungrounded disposition to localize is therefore the fundamental ontological 
tenet of this interpretation of QM. Isolated particles of course exist, also before 
localizing, in the sense they are somewhere in spacetime, but the fact that they can be 
“here” as well as on the moon poses some methodological difficulty in the relationship 
of this version of GRW with an ontology of events. I am not thinking of the problem 
of giving a relativistic invariant version of the localizing process; I am thinking of the 
possibility of giving a spatiotemporal description of isolated entities prior to their 
localizations, in such a way as to have a well-funded notion of event, the building 
block of relativity. The difficulty seems to be that before a localization, there are no 
categorical spatial properties to which we can refer for assigning spatial relations. It is 
only via macroscopic objects that we can do so: chairs, rulers, table, trees just are the 
product of an amazingly large numbers of localizations events.  
In a word, I am claiming that we cannot have an ontology of events before the 
localizations – even though we may have bare Newtonian spacetime (for 
substantivalists) – because we have no precise localizations for isolated particles. It is 
for this reason that, within an ontological option in which there are irreducible 
dispositions of the GRW type, it is reasonable to follow Bell [22] and assume that 
physical spacetime, regarded as the set of localized physical occurrences, is just 
constituted by or identical with the set of all “flashes”, or localizations, occurring at a 
precise location at a certain time. These are events because they are well localized, and 
are endowed with sufficiently categorical properties (first and foremost a precise 
location in spacetime) for being the basis for a reconstruction of the properties of 
                                                 
9 This historical parallel is due to Van Fraassen. 
tables and chairs. But it is important to notice that the notion of event allowed by the 
this version of GRW is macroscopical, not microscopical. 
My claim is therefore that the irreducible character of localizations in GRW (in one 
of its interpretations) is equivalent to, or at least entails, the impossibility of giving a 
spatiotemporal description which can be used to explain or ground the localizations 
events. Rather, it is the collection of such localization events that constitute both 
physical spacetime and the world around us: as Bell put it, a piece of matter is a 
galaxies of such [localization] events [22, p. 204]. In a word, at least in this reading of 
GRW’s ontology, spacetime is simply derived out of quantum events, a feature that 
might be interesting in quantum gravity programs, insofar as the latter requires that 
spacetime be a non-fundamental, derived, emergent notion. 
We should recall that in another reduction model proposed by Ghirardi, the 
fundamental entity is a scalar field ρ = ρ (r, t) defined on Newtonian spacetime, with 
ρ being, at macroscopic scale, what we call mass density of physical objects. In this 
interpretation, the wave function Ψ(r1, …rn , t) describes the system at a given time, and 
the square modulus of Ψ of determines, for each particles i, how much stuff (ρ i) there 
is in a given cell:  
 
 ),(),( tmt i
i
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In this view, some categorical properties are ascribed to the scalar field ρ and even 
though the density of microscopic objects can be in a superposed state and enjoy “the 
cloudiness of waves”[17, p.349], due to the localization mechanisms the mass density 
of macroscopic objects (Schrödinger’s poor cat) acquires a precise value in a split 
second, and the object localizes somewhere via an irreducibly stochastic event.   
We conclude by pointing out that, from our chosen perspective, the main difference 
between Bohm’s and GRW’s interpretations lies in the different way in which they 
treat dispositional properties: reducible in the former case, irreducible in the latter. As 
a consequence, while in the former case Bohm’s theory is about a family of 
trajectories in spacetime and spacetime is a fundamental notion – spacetime just is a 
class of histories of events with genidentical relations bearing with one another a 
relation of temporal succession – in the interpretation of GRW à la Bell, physical 
spacetime is a derived notion. In the “mass density reading” of reduction models, bare, 
“empty” spacetime is so to speak already presupposed for the scalar field to be defined 
on it, but what is acquired via the localization mechanism is the possibility of 
individuating macroscopic bodies via their location. Although the scalar field ρ is in 
spacetime, also in this case the precise individuation that makes an ontology of events 
possible is realized only “after” the stochastic processes.  
In a word, the irreducible, non-categorical nature of the fundamental properties 
postulated by GRW is linked to the fact that, in reduction models, physical spacetime 
is derived via the localization processes which are macroscopic events, while in 
Bohmian mechanics events can be as microscopic as particles are.  
                                                 
10 For a nice explanation of this formula, see [6, p.376]. 
DISPOSITIONS IN NO-COLLAPSE INTERPRETATIONS 
 
In order to probe the consequences of the many-worlds interpretation for the 
dispositional or categorical nature of its postulated ontology, let us write the quantum 
state of the universe as a superposition of various “worlds”:11  
 
 |ΨUniverse > = ∑i ci |Ψ World-i >   (4) 
 
with the usual condition ∑i |ci |2 = 1.  
In this view, each world behaves like a quasi-classical world of categorical 
properties, in which “indefinite” or fuzzy properties (i.e., superpositions) are absent. 
Consequently, there is a sense in which, in the many-world interpretation, quantum 
dispositions are “locally” reducible, or better, eliminable in each semi-classical 
world composing the big superposition. 
However, since the whole universe is in a global state of superposition, we could as 
well conclude that, relative to the quantum state of the universe, which is a perfectly 
definite quantum state from a mathematical viewpoint, the physical properties of the 
universe are indefinite. Relative to the quantum state of the universe, we cannot claim 
that the moon has a definite position, given that the definiteness of such a property is 
only a relative matter, depending on, and varying with, different worlds, branches, 
minds, or perspectives, according to terminology. Consequently, in the many-
worlds/many perspectives view it could be maintained that there is a sense in which 
the properties of the quantum universe (say, having a certain density at a certain time) 
can be understood as being irreducibly dispositional i.e., as being capable of having 
different definite “manifestations” in different worlds or branches or minds, all of 
them being equally real.  
It could be objected that we should rather talk about the relational character of the 
properties in the quantum universe, since a dispositional property presupposes in 
principle the possibility of some sort of interaction for its manifestation, an interaction 
which in the many-world view seems absent. And this would be correct if no 
interacting correlation were envisaged.  
However, that a dispositional reading of the many-worlds interpretations is not so 
implausible can be gathered from the notion of a centered-world developed by Simon 
Saunders [26]: if the world is centered on a human being, only perceived states are 
definite, and non-perceived ones are really superposed. Reality in itself is an entangled 
mess, and has the ungrounded, irreducible disposition to correlate to our brain states in 
such a way that we perceive the world as having definite properties. Never has an 
interpretation of a physical theory put more emphasis on the radical gap between the 
way the world is (reality) and how it appears to us: in this view, the above mentioned 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities evaporates, as all properties are 
secondary.12  
Consequently, the question whether in the many-worlds view quantum dispositional 
properties are irreducible either (A) admits no definite answer or (B) it receives a 
                                                 
11 Here I follow Lev Vaidman’s notation [24]. 
12 For the problem of the empirical coherence of Everett’s type views of QM, see [27]. 
positive one. Within the alternative (A), by focusing alternatively on the quantum state 
of the universe or on the single worlds composing it, we oscillate, respectively, from 
the irreducibility to the reducibility of quantum superpositions. In another, more 
plausible reading, however, which is closer to Everett’s original intent of introducing 
many different perspectives on the same superposed indefinite universe, we have 
alternative (B): what is “really real” or mind-independent is the superposed state of the 
quantum universe, and the definiteness of the quasi-classical worlds is somehow less 
fundamental if not illusory, given that the classical world in which superpositions are 
eliminated is a world “centered” on the brains of human beings: the quantum state of 
the physical systems around us has the irreducible disposition to correlate in 
appropriate ways to human brains.  
Also in this view, as it should be obvious, the definiteness of position in spacetime 
is a derived notion, since it is only in the single worlds that we can have definiteness 
of position and time of physical entities, something confirming our claim: the 
irreducibility of QM dispositions in a given interpretation is correlated to the fact that 
in that interpretation spacetime is a derived, non fundamental notion. 
Rovelli’s Relational Version of QM 
According to Rovelli’s relational view of QM [28], a quantum system Q can be said 
to possess a certain property q only relative to a system S; relative to another observing 
system (measuring apparatus) S’, Q and S may be in an indefinite state, i.e., in a 
superposition. Such a view of QM is radically instrumentalist, insofar as it considers 
the Ψ−function as a mere bookkeeping devise, while focusing just on the sequence of 
actual measurement outcomes q1, q2,…, qn. Such outcomes are to be regarded as the 
result of correlations of quantum systems with particular “observing physical 
systems” S, and no meaning is attached to the claim that an isolated quantum system Q 
has intrinsic properties. In Rovelli’s and Laudisa’s words: «there is no meaning in 
saying that a certain quantum event has happened or that a variable of the system S has 
taken the value q: rather, there is meaning in saying that the event q has happened or 
the variable has taken the value q for O, or with respect to O… Quantum events only 
happen in interactions between systems, and the fact that a quantum event has 
happened is only true with respect to the systems involved in the interaction. The 
unique account of the state of the world of the classical theory is thus fractured into a 
multiplicity of accounts, one for each possible “observing” physical system.» [29, sect. 
2] 
Since in its context we cannot talk about intrinsic properties of physical systems, 
for our purpose it is important to stress that according to Rovelli’s relational 
interpretation, the quantum world possesses no categorical properties at all. In this 
interpretation, the notion of “correlation” is so central that all properties of the 
quantum universe are not only relational, but also irreducibly dispositional, as they 
presuppose a physical interaction. In Rovelli’s interpretation, it is meaningless to even 
think of categorical properties that ground the disposition to show certain values of 
position, spin etc.: while correlation events may be ascribed physical reality, the 
magnitudes that are the relata of the correlations cannot, as they are irreducibly 
dispositional.  
Also in the case of this interpretation, the presence of irreducible disposition is 
linked to the fact that spacetime emerges from, or is constituted out of, the 
innumerable correlation events between quantum systems and classical systems: there 
is no possibility of attaching categorical properties to microsystems prior to 
correlations. All properties are irreducibly dispositional. 
 
DISPOSITIONS IN BOHR’S INTERPRETATION OF QM 
 
Recently, historians have insisted that Bohr’s view of QM should be differentiated 
from the so-called “Copenhagen interpretation”, the latter being a sort of straw-man 
position created by philosophers [30]. By focusing just on Bohr’s view, here I want by 
no means to suggest that Bohr’s own interpretation is not afflicted by remarkable 
difficulties, in particular the lack of a precise distinction between the quantum and the 
classical domain. 
Even if Redhead is probably right in thinking that according to Bohr it is simply 
meaningless to attribute a system whose state is not an eigenstate of the relevant 
observable any property before and independently of measurement [15, pp. 49-51], 
Bohr certainly believed in the reality or mind-independence of atomic systems (entity 
realism). In this sense, he was antirealist about QM as a theory, while being a realist 
about its theoretical entities: in a word, he was no instrumentalist. In addition, I think 
it is fair to claim that he defended a strong form of experimental dispositionalism, 
which is exactly what interests us here. The relationship between the principle of 
complementarity of non-commuting observables and the dispositional nature of 
quantum entities has been first stressed by Bohr, and has not been sufficiently noticed 
by physicists and philosophers writing on him.  
According to Bohr, two properties (like being particle-like or being wave-like, or 
having a definite position vs. having a definite momentum) are complementary if and 
only if they are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive [31]. We say that they are 
mutually exclusive because, from the point of view of the classical language, after 
measurement they can be attributed to the same classical system at the same time only 
via a contradiction. In fact, complementary properties cannot be simultaneously 
revealed by the same experiment, given that any apparatus obeys classical physics. On 
the other hand, if we refer to a quantum system before measurement, the 
complementary properties must be regarded as jointly exhaustive, because any attempt 
at attributing a not-yet measured micro-system only one of the two properties would 
yield an incomplete description. For instance, an electron is neither a particle nor a 
wave, but has intrinsic, dispositional features to being both. The principle of 
complementarity is therefore at the root of the merely “potential” character of the 
quantum world before measurement. 
In order to be coherent with his complementarity view of QM, in fact, Bohr claims 
that the quantum world must be irreducibly dispositional, where irreducible refers to 
his disbelief in hidden, deterministic variables grounding the indefinite state of the 
system before measurement, and dispositional refers to the holistic nature of the 
micro-system, the manifestation of properties being holistically depending on the kind 
of experiment one wants to perform.  
Granting, as we should, that Bohr believed in the mind-independence of atoms and 
particles [32], the dispositional character of the quantum world is consequently an 
essential characteristic of his interpretation of QM. The main reason for this claim is 
given by the fact, often repeated by Bohr especially in his debate with Einstein, that 
the manifestation of the “properties” of quantum systems requires an experiment, and 
the nature of the experiment determines which “aspect” (which of the complementary 
properties) of the quantum system will be revealed. 
Take the familiar apparatus for a two-slits experiment: do we want to observe the 
interference effects and thereby manifest the typical wave-like nature of the quantum 
system on the fluorescent screen behind the slits? Then, as instrumentalist followers of 
Bohr usually put it, we must renounce to have any information about its particle-like 
aspect, for instance by trying to find out which slit the particle went through. I would 
suggest that in order to remain faithful to Bohr’s entity realism, we should put the 
matter more realistically: by deciding to perform an experiment on the wavelike 
aspect, we must somehow destroy a dispositional aspect of the system, related to its 
particle-like, complementary disposition.  
For our purposes, it is important to note that the quantum system’s wavelike 
manifested property causally depends on its interaction with the apparatus, and 
therefore on what we decided to measure. According to Bohr’s interpretation, we 
cannot assume that there is a categorical basis for the manifestation of the wavelike 
property before a measurement interaction, since this would be equivalent to assume 
that the wavelike aspect was there all along before measurement, at the exclusion of 
the particle-like, complementary aspect. But an unmeasured system has both 
dispositions. If we assumed such a categorical basis for the wave-like aspect of the 
system, we could not explain why, if we closed one of the two slits, the interference 
effects due to the superposition would be lost, and on the screen we would observe 
just an enlarged image of the slit.  
Using the stipulations above, we are now in the position to understand Bohr’s 
refusal of hidden variable theories (and his consequent belief in the completeness of 
QM) as being equivalent to the claim that there is no categorical basis for neither of 
the dual, “complementary” aspects of the quantum systems. Furthermore, to the extent 
that QM is, as Bohr thought, complete, there is no possessed (non dispositional) 
property before measurement (when the system is not in an eigenstate of the 
observable), since it is meaningless to attribute any property to a quantum system 
independently of a measurement context.  
In a word, Bohr’s entity realism gives us a belief in irreducible dispositions, a 
language that Bohr himself never used explicitly, but to which, I submit, he would not 
have objected at all: given his belief about the existence of theoretical entities, he had 
to take a stance about their way of existence vis à vis their dynamical features, and 
irreducible dispositionality would serve his purpose well. Quantum properties, 
according to a minimally realistic reading of Bohr, are irreducibly dispositional 
because experiments create, at least in part the dynamical properties they measure.13  
                                                 
13 Mass, spin and charge are intrinsically possessed also according to Bohr. 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It is time to draw our take-home lesson from the quick and necessarily brief 
overview of some of the main interpretations of the formalism of QM.  
(1) If interpreting means trying to figure out what is out there in the physical world, 
dispositions are ubiquitous in all such interpretations, and yield a sort of unifying 
language for views that are widely different among them, as Bohr’s and Bohm’s are;  
(2) With the important exception of Bohm’s minimalist interpretation sketched 
above, all such dispositions are irreducible to categorical, non-contextually possessed 
properties; 
(3) the reason why the non-Bohmian views are committed to irreducible 
dispositions is importantly different in GRW on the one hand, and in the non-collapse 
views and Bohr on the other.  
(4) In the former case (GRW), we have irreducibly stochastic processes that have 
no categorical basis because such processes are fundamentally uncaused. In the latter 
case, we have irreducible dispositions because the quantum world before measurement 
(when the state is not an eigenstate of the relevant observable) is regarded as devoid of 
any definite, intrinsic property whatsoever. What is emphasized in the former view is a 
new physical process, regarded as responsible for the solid, perceived definiteness of 
the classical world. In the latter views, metaphysical considerations about irreducible 
dispositionality are upheld to try to prevent any further physical inquiry into the nature 
of measurement interactions, or any deeper explanations of the reason why Born’s |Ψ|2 
holds and works. If categorical bases of dispositions are regarded as lacking, no such 
physical progress is going to be possible in principle. The possibility that an 
ideological, obscurantist role of dispositionality be hidden in the latter views should 
not be excluded at all;  
(5) a common element between the views defending irreducible dispositions could 
be linked to their disavowal of the possibility of a spatiotemporal description of a 
quantum system prior to a collapse, for collapse views, prior to a correlation with any 
other system, for the many-world theorists and Rovelli, or prior to a measuring process 
realized via a classical apparatus for Bohr. The role of an event ontology in the various 
interpretation of QM should be studied more accurately than it has been done so far 
[33]  
(6) Despite one’s inclinations toward realism about dispositions, it is one thing to 
claim that dispositions, as in the classical case, are identical with, reducible to, or 
explainable by other categorical properties, or even other more microscopic 
dispositions. It is quite another thing to have to swallow irreducible dispositions as in 
Bohr’s or the Everettian views. It must be granted that introducing irreducible physical 
dispositions is implicitly admitting that there is something we don’t understand. 
Admitting an in-principle lack of any categorical basis to which dispositions could be 
reduced, in both the non-collapse views and Bohr’s seems a way to surrender to 
mystery. 
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